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I. INTRODUCTION
I did not know then how much was ended.  When I look back now from this
high hill of my old age, I can still see the butchered women and children lying
heaped and scattered all along the crooked gulch as plain as when I saw them
with eyes still young and I can see that something else died there in the blood
mud, and was buried in the blizzard.  A people’s dream died there.  It was a
beautiful dream.1
So spoke Black Elk, a holy man of the Oglala Lakota, as he
remembered the Wounded Knee Massacre.  Wounded Knee largely
marked the end of the U.S. military campaign against the plains
tribes.2  For Black Elk and the Oglala, it marked the end of much
more.  Black Elk believed if the dream of his people were ever to be
revived, it would be in the seventh generation.3  The calculations of
many people living on the Oglala Pine Ridge Reservation say the
youth of today are that generation.4  But Black Elk spoke of conse-
quence, not just capability.  Should the seventh generation fail, Black
Elk believed the Lakota race would die out.5
1. JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS 230 (Pocket Book ed., 1972).
2. See DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (1970).
3. Collen Kenney, Ghosts of Whiteclay, LINCOLN J. STAR, Sept. 23, 2007, http://
journalstar.com/special-section/news/the-ghosts-of-whiteclay/article_10e860bc-1b
1d-522b-8827-655ce764751f.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/S46T-428K.
There is a saying in Lakota that translates into “building for the seventh genera-
tion.”  Lakota Mowrer, Building for the Seventh Generation, TEACH FOR AM.: FEA-
TURED STORIES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.teachforamerica.org/blog/building-
seventh-generation, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ZH33-334W.
4. Kenney, supra note 3. See also Bernie Hunhoff, Black Elk Was Right, S. D. MAG.,
Mar. 23, 2013, http://southdakotamagazine.com/seventh-generation, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/5YBJ-NJ4X (calculating the mid-19th century as the begin-
ning of the first generation).
5. Kenney, supra note 3.
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Charging fifteen to twenty-five-year-olds with the survivorship of
an entire people is a lot to ask young shoulders to bear.  But that re-
sponsibility is not limited to only Lakota youth.  In passing the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA),6 Congress found “no resource . . . is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes
than their children.”7  By creating standards to govern the removal of
Indian children from their families, Congress hoped it could promote
tribal security and stability.8
The chances of fully achieving these goals have been impeded by
the Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.9  By
holding that an Indian parent who never obtains custody of his child is
not privy to the protections offered by ICWA, the Supreme Court has
severely limited the Act’s application.  Tribal security and stability are
hampered when Indian children are raised outside of the Native com-
munity because the opportunity to pass on tribal customs, traditions,
leadership and culture disappears.10  This Note begins by exploring
the historical facts leading to the passage of ICWA, its key provisions,
and its application.  Part III discusses Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
and the changes the Supreme Court has made to ICWA.  Part IV con-
cludes by arguing how in an effort to do right, the majority of Supreme
Court Justices twisted ICWA to arrive at a conclusion the statute, if
read plainly, does not support.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of ICWA
1. Indian Child Removal Pre-ICWA
ICWA was the product of four years of congressional research,
hearings, deliberations and drafting.11  The impetus for the law came
from tribes and their allies, motivated by witnessing state child-wel-
fare policies remove Indian children from their families at cata-
strophic rates.12  In Minnesota, one out of every four Indian children
6. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1934 (2012).
7. Id. § 1901(3).
8. Id. § 1902.
9. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
10. See Christine Metteer, The Existing Indian Family Exception: An Impediment to
the Trust Responsibility to Preserve Tribal Existence and Culture as Manifested in
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 647, 651–52 (1997) (noting
Indian children are the only real means of transmitting tribal heritage and that
heritage is lost if those children grow up in non-Indian homes).
11. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 27 (1978).
12. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Indian Af-
fairs of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. (1974) [hereinafter
1974 S. Hearing].
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under the age of one lived in an adoptive home.13  In Washington, In-
dian parents lost their children at rates nineteen times those of non-
Indian parents.14  In South Dakota, Indian children comprised seven
percent of the state’s population, but accounted for a little under half
of all state adoptees.15
2. Factors Driving Removal Rates
a. Physical Abuse
Governments, whether state or tribal, have an obligation to protect
children when their home is not safe.16  But physical violence does not
explain the extraordinary high removal rates tribal families exper-
ienced.  One North Dakota tribe indicated only one percent of their
children were removed because of allegations of physical abuse.17  A
northwestern tribe reported similar percentages.18  An Oregon tribe
indicated that all of the 800 tribal children removed from their biologi-
cal homes were categorized as neglect cases, without physical abuse
present.19  Indeed, physical child abuse was “virtually unknown” in
Indian communities.20  This was particularly remarkable at the time
because medical doctors were beginning to recognize, diagnosis, and
report physical child abuse.21
b. Ethnocentrism22
Instead, cultural ignorance, ethnocentrism, or outright prejudice
were cited as factors driving the high removal rates.23  Standards of
13. Id. at 3 (statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association of American
Indian Affairs).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (“[T]he state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affect-
ing the child’s welfare . . . .”).
17. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of William Byler, Executive Di-
rector, Association of American Indian Affairs).
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 101 (statement of Dr. James H. Shore).
20. Id. at 110.  Dr. Score believed this was a culture difference, which ironically
worked against Indian communities.  Traditional Indian practices frowned upon
physical discipline of children, which led non-Indian outside observers to con-
clude Indian parents did not actively or competently raise their children. Id. at
103–04 (statement of Dr. James H. Shore).
21. Id. at 103 (question by Sen. Abourezk).
22. Meaning “characterized by or based on the attitude that one’s own group is
superior.” WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 393 (3d ed. 1973).
23. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 4; Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1294 (1980). But
see Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 52 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 S. Hearing]
(statement of Raymond V. Butler, Acting Deputy Comm’r, Bureau of Indian Af-
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child abuse and neglect were based upon white, middle-class, subur-
ban values.24  The Senate subcommittee heard testimony that a few
caseworkers believed simply living on a reservation was evidence
enough to remove a child because “an Indian reservation is an unsuit-
able environment for a child.”25
Caseworkers classified leaving children with individuals outside
the immediate nuclear family as neglect,26 despite the fact that ex-
tended family is a fundamental part of Native culture.27  Ella Delo-
ria28 noted tribes spent hundreds of years living in close communal
groups where making everyone family preserved peace and har-
mony.29  She explained:
[T]he ultimate aim of . . . life . . . was quite simple: one must be a good rela-
tive . . . .  In the last analysis, every other consideration was secondary—prop-
erty, personal ambition, glory, good times, life itself.  Without that aim and
the constant struggle to attain it, the people would no longer be Dakotas in
truth.  They would no longer even be human.30
If the whole point of life is to be a good relative, labeling someone
an unfit one had catastrophic consequences for parents and, by exten-
sion, tribes.  As the chairwoman of the Puyallup Tribe put it: “[I]f you
fairs, Dep’t of the Interior) (noting the majority of BIA employees working with
Indian families were themselves Indian).
24. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 4 (statement of William Byler, Executive Di-
rector, Association of American Indian Affairs).
25. Id. at 19–20.  The irony of this, Byler commented, was apparent.  “[T]ribes that
were forced onto reservations at gunpoint and prohibited from leaving without a
permit, are now being told that they live in a place unfit for raising their chil-
dren.” Id. at 20; see also Janet L. Wallace and Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Parents,
Judging Place: Poverty, Rurality, and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L.
REV. 95 (arguing that while courts have stated poverty is an impermissible basis
for termination of parental rights, many make rural places a proxy for poverty
and terminate on that basis instead).
26. See Barsh supra note 23, at 1294.
27. See, e.g., ELLA DELORIA, SPEAKING OF INDIANS 17, 19 (Dakota Press 1979).  For
instance, in Dakota (Sioux) culture, one had many fathers (all the men someone’s
own father called brother or cousin) and mothers (all the women someone’s
mother called sister or cousin). Id. at 18.  When an individual married, all the
newlywed’s newly acquired relatives became relatives of their consanguine fam-
ily as well. Id.
28. Deloria was born in 1889 on the Yankton Sioux Reservation and was member of
that tribe.  Fluent in both English and the Dakota dialectics and holding a degree
from Columbia University, she dedicated much of her life to authoring assorted
manuscripts and books about Dakota culture and traditions in the hopes of con-
veying this knowledge to a predominately white readership. AGNES M. PICOTTE
& PAUL N. PAVICH, INTRODUCTION TO SPEAKING OF INDIANS xi–xix (Dakota Press
1979).
29. Deloria, supra note 27, at 17, 19.
30. Id. at 17–18.
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lose your children, you are dead; you are never going to be rehabili-
tated . . . the whole family unit is not ever going to get well.”31
Some argued the high rates of child removal lead Indian parents to
expect their children to be taken from them.32  Coupled with the crip-
pling emotional effects of losing a child, this expectation created a self-
fulfilling prophecy where fear of emotional attachment led to poor pa-
rental behavior and ultimately, removal.33
Inevitably, stereotypical views about Indian communities and per-
ceived alcohol abuse were trotted out as a justification for the high
removal rates.34  Tribes have frequently been typecast as locked in a
constant battle against alcohol.35  Yet, studies show alcohol plays a
role in the majority of child abuse incidents, regardless of race.36  Tes-
timony at the hearings suggested this fact was frequently ignored.37
While alcohol abuse would likely result in the removal of a child from
an Indian family, white families battling alcohol addictions were more
31. 1977 S. Hearing, supra note 23, at 164 (statement of Puyallup Tribe Chairwoman
Ramona Bennett); see also Barsh, supra note 23, at 1291 (citing a psychiatric
study noting the removal of a child “effectively destroyed the family as an intact
unit”).
32. Barsh, supra note 23, at 1292.
33. Id.
34. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 4 (statement of William Byler, Executive Di-
rector, Association of American Indian Affairs); Barsh, supra note 23, at 1295.
35. Scholars have floated forty-two different theories to explain alcoholism among
Indian populations. See GARY L. FISHER & THOMAS G. HARRISION, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE: INFORMATION FOR SCHOOL COUNSELORS, SOCIAL WORKERS, THERAPISTS,
AND COUNSELORS 54 (4th ed., Pearson 2009).  Much less attention is paid to alco-
hol abstinence in Indian communities.  For instance, the percent of Indian
mothers abstaining from alcohol preconception (45%) is nearly identical to that of
their white peers (46.5%). Alcohol Abstinence, Preconception, HEALTHINDI-
CATORS.GOV, http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Alcohol-abstinence-pre-
conception-percent_1181/Profile/ClassicData (last visited Oct. 16, 2013), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/94ZY-P4YE.  Some argue the dominant approach to alco-
hol in Indian communities has been abstinence for the past two hundred years.
Raul Caetano et al., Alcohol Consumption Among Racial/Ethnic Minorities, 22
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 233, 237 (1998), archived at http://perma.unl.
edu/TW5Q-9Y27.
36. Substance abuse plays a role in approximately 50–80% of all child maltreatment
cases.  In almost two out of every three cases where parental substance abuse
was the leading cause of maltreatment, the drug of choice was alcohol.  Bridget
Freisthler, A Spatial Analysis of Social Disorganization, Alcohol Access and the
Rates of Child Maltreatment in Neighborhoods, 26 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERVICES
REV. 803, 804 (2004).  Physical abuse was not a leading cause of Indian child
removal, anyway. See 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of William
Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian Affairs).
37. See, e.g., 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 20 (written statement of William
Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian Affairs); id. at 42
(statement of Margaret Townsend); id. at 102 (statement of Dr. James H. Shore).
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likely to be provided with support services and allowed to keep their
children with them than were Indian parents.38
c. Institutional Structure
Institutional factors further contributed to the high rates of re-
moval of Indian children.  As the availability of birth control and abor-
tions increased, the number of healthy white children available for
adoption decreased, and private agencies found more couples seeking
newborns of any race.39  Bertram Hirsch, an attorney with the Associ-
ation of American Indian Affairs, argued a “gray market” for Indian
children existed.40  The testimony of many Indian mothers supported
this theory.41
Many families at risk of losing their children lacked access to effec-
tive attorneys or the courts.42  Parents were frequently never notified
about case hearings or general progress.43  Sometimes, they were
never told where their children were because, once placed with a fos-
ter or adoptive family, social workers told them their own child’s infor-
mation was “confidential.”44
Some thought the overall institutional goal was Indian assimila-
tion by tribal destruction and taking children was the quickest means
to achieve this.45
I think it’s a copout when people say it’s poverty that’s causing [child re-
moval].  I think perhaps the chief thing is the detribalization and decultural-
ization, Federal and State and local efforts to make Indians white.  It hasn’t
38. Id.
39. Barsh, supra note 23, at 1299.
40. “I think it is more accurately described as a gray market [not black market].  [Lo-
cal welfare workers] have long lists of non-Indian applicants for Indian children,
and they feel obliged for a whole variety of social reasons to comply with the
orders that they received for children.” 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 70
(statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian
Affairs).
41. Id. at 51–53 (statement of Mrs. Alex Fournier) (describing an incident where wel-
fare workers literally dragged a two-year-old child out of the courtroom kicking
and screaming in order to place him for adoption); id. at 68 (statement of Cheryl
DeCoteau) (relating how she was pressured to place her child up for adoption on a
weekly basis while still pregnant); id. at 5 (statement of William Byler, Executive
Director, Association of American Indian Affairs) (discussing financial incentives
for adopting Indian children).
42. Barsh, supra note 23, at 1300.
43. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 66 (statement of Mrs. Cheryl DeCoteau); id. at
4 (statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association of American In-
dian Affairs); Barsh, supra note 23, at 1300.
44. See 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 8 (1974) (statement of William Byler, Ex-
ecutive, Director, Association of American Indian Affairs); id. at 66 (statement of
Mrs. Cheryl DeCoteau).
45. Id. at 377 (written testimony of Ed Howes); 1977 S. Hearing, supra note 23, at
81–82 (written statement of National Congress of American Indians); 124 CONG.
REC. H38,102 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).
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worked and it will never work and one of the most vicious forms of trying to do
this is to take their children.46
After decades of watching school-aged Indian children forcibly sepa-
rated from their families and marched off to boarding schools or relig-
ious institutions, it was not surprising the government would
eventually get around to collecting infants.47
B. Overview of ICWA
Armed with this testimony, Congress went to work under its con-
stitutional authority “to regulate Commerce with . . . the Indian
tribes.”48  The resulting law was enacted in 1978.49  Congress de-
clared it national policy “to protect the best interests of Indian chil-
dren and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families.”50  ICWA contains two major prongs to fulfill this policy.
First, it sets forth minimal procedural protections for Indian child cus-
tody proceedings to discourage child removal unless absolutely neces-
sary.51  Second, it authorizes special grants for programs to
strengthen tribes and families, thereby removing the need—real or
perceived—for intervention in the first place.52
This Note focuses on the procedural protections offered in the first
prong.  These protections are extended to child custody proceedings,
which encompass foster care placements, termination of parental
rights, and preadoptive and adoptive placements.53  ICWA gives tribes
a leading role in deciding what happens to their children.  Tribal
46. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 13 (statement of William Byler, Executive
Director, Association of American Indian Affairs).
47. See Kim Laree Schnuelle, When the Bough Breaks: Federal and Washington State
Indian Child Welfare Law and Its Application, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 101,
101–04 (1993) (discussing early assimilation tactics).  For more on the assimila-
tion tactics used in Indian boarding schools and their long term effects, see
Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NPR (May 12,
2008, 12:01AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16516865
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4C2X-L79M; Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The
Legacy of Native American Schools, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 26, 2007), http://
www.amnestyusa.org/node/87342, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/M3M5-HWJ
V.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Not everyone agrees that Congress had the power to
enact ICWA in the first place.  “Because adoption proceedings . . . involve neither
‘commerce’ nor ‘Indian tribes,’ there is simply no constitutional basis for Con-
gress’ assertion of authority over [child custody proceedings].”  Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 27–28 (1978) (out-
lining legislative history of bill).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
51. Id. §§ 1911–23; Barsh, supra note 23, at 1287.
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1931–34; Barsh, supra note 23, at 1287.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
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courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding
where the child resides or is domiciled on the reservation.54  Absent
good cause, state courts must transfer child custody proceedings to tri-
bal courts when the child is living outside the reservation.55  Tribes
may intervene in state court proceedings involving foster care place-
ment or termination of parental rights at any point56 and must be
given notice, as must a parent, of pending foster care placement or
termination decisions.57  Standards of proof are also higher under
ICWA.  To terminate parental rights, the moving party must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt continued custody by an Indian parent is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.58
The typical burden is clear and convincing evidence.59  Efforts to pre-
vent removal or rehabilitate parents protected by ICWA must be ac-
tive,60 not just reasonable.61  Parents of Indian children also are
entitled to longer time frames in which to withdraw consent for volun-
tary foster care placements or termination proceedings.62  Finally,
Congress created adoptive and foster care placement preferences,
starting with the child’s extended family and concluding with any
other Indian family63 before opening the door to other options.
C. Existing Indian Family Exception
Four years after ICWA was adopted, the statute was judicially
tested by the Supreme Court of Kansas in In re Adoption of Baby Boy
L.64  Baby Boy L. was born to an unwed, non-Indian mother, who
promptly placed him with an adoptive couple (also non-Indian).65
Baby Boy L.’s biological father was an enrolled member of the Kiowa
Tribe and answered the complaint seeking to terminate his parental
54. Id. § 1911(a).
55. § 1911(b).
56. § 1911(c).
57. Id. § 1912(a).
58. § 1912(f).
59. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982); ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING
CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 15.11 (2d ed. 1987); Catherine M.
Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, a Foundation
for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 670 (1994).
60. § 1912(d).
61. Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2013).  Active efforts
have to go beyond letting parents know that services are available.  Service prov-
iders should actually walk troubled parents through a rehabilitation plan, step by
step, and efforts on the part of service providers must be “aggressive,” even if the
recipient is reluctant or disinterested. HARALAMBIE, supra note 59, at § 15.11;
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INDIAN CHILD WEL-
FARE ACT 94 (2007).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1913; Brooks, supra note 59, at 670.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
64. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
65. Id. at 172.
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rights by asserting that ICWA applied.66  The trial court refused to
apply ICWA because the child had never been in the father’s,67 or his
family’s, care or custody.68  After studying the legislative history of
ICWA,69 the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed, reasoning ICWA was
“not to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a mem-
ber of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should
be removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian
environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother.”70
In short, ICWA protected existing Indian families; it was not designed
to create them.  Three years later, Oklahoma reached the same con-
clusion on nearly identical facts.71
Critics assail the exception as a court created end-run of the stat-
ute’s express and implied intent.72  Under the doctrine, courts ask
what it means to be Indian, and answer using, usually, a white stan-
dard of “Indian-ness.”73  Allowing courts to make this call intrudes
upon tribal sovereignty.74  Allowing state courts to decide on a case-
by-case basis who to apply ICWA to destroys the uniformity Congress
intended by enacting a federal statute.75  Ultimately, critics fear the
66. Id. at 173.
67. It appears Father was incarcerated when Baby Boy L. was born, or shortly there-
after. Id. at 172–173.
68. Id. at 175.
69. The Court likely had abundant evidence about ICWA’s legislative history as the
same Bertram Hirsch who had testified at the congressional hearings with the
Association of American Indian Affairs was allowed to counsel and advise the
lawyers appearing on behalf of the father during the proceedings. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
72. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 632 (2002);
Cheyanna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children,
66 LA. L. REV. 733, 734 (2006); Suzianne D. Painter-Thomas, One Step Forward,
Two Giant Steps Back: How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)Imposes
Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cul-
tural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 367 (2008).
73. See Jaffke, supra note 72, at 751–52. See also State ex rel. D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993,
999 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“Engrafting a new requirement into ICWA that allows
the dominant society to judge whether the parent’s cultural background meets its
view of what ‘Indian culture’ should be puts the state courts right back into the
position from which Congress has removed them.”).
74. Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Ex-
isting Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 36 (1998) (stating tribes
alone have the authority to set membership requirements).
75. See B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to
Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State
Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 421–22 (1997) (discussing the different ways states
have seemed to “redraft” federal legislation and noting ICWA has no financial
component Congress can use to threaten states to tow the line); See also Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (reasoning Congress
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existing Indian family exception will return tribes to their precarious,
pre-ICWA, position.76
The doctrine has created a split among state courts, although the
majority reject it.  Kansas and Oklahoma, pioneers in creating the ex-
ception, have abandoned it.77  Alaska,78 Arizona,79 Colorado,80
Idaho,81 Iowa,82 Michigan,83 New Jersey,84 New York,85 North Da-
kota,86 South Dakota,87 Utah,88 and Washington89also reject the doc-
trine.  Arkansas90 and Pennsylvania91 appear to have rejected the
exception as well.  The doctrine is good law in Alabama,92 Indiana,93
Kentucky,94 Louisiana,95 Missouri,96 Nevada,97 and Tennessee.98
had not intended to leave the word “domicile” in ICWA up to state law definition
because it would leave nationwide uniformity nonexistent).
76. See Painter-Thomas, supra note 72, at 332.
77. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 549–51 (Kan. 2009); Leatherman v. Yancy (In re Baby
Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099, 1108 (Okla. 2004).  Oklahoma has also statutorily re-
jected the doctrine. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 40.3(B) (2013).
78. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977–78 (Alaska 1989).
79. Michael J. v. Michael J., 7 P.3d 960, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
80. In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 21–22 (Colo. App. 2007).
81. Indian Tribe v. Doe, 849 P.2d. 925, 927 (Idaho 1993).
82. See IOWA CODE § 232B.5(2) (2012) (upheld and applied in In re D.S. 806 N.W.2d
458, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)).
83. In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
84. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1988).
85. Baby Boy C. v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 322–23 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005).
86. Hoots v. K.B. (In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003).
87. In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–90 (S.D. 1990) (overturning the
adoption of the doctrine in Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987)).
88. State ex rel. D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
89. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.040(1)(a) (2013) (superseding Adoption of Crews, 825
P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)); In re Parenting & Support of Beach, 246 P.3d 845, 848
(Wash. App. Ct. 2011).
90. See Stephens v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 249, at 5 (applying
ICWA requirement of an expert witness even though mom was non-Indian and
dad was Indian but apparently uninvolved and “completely non-compliant”).
91. In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting, appar-
ently, doctrine by returning a child who had lived with a non-Indian adoptive
mother to her adoptive Indian mother because the “Act is based on the funda-
mental assumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest that its relation-
ship to the tribe be protected”).
92. Ex parte C.L.J., 946 So. 2d 880, 888–89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (applying doctrine
only in limited circumstances where the child is illegitimate, surrendered by non-
Indian mother and never involved in tribal culture.  If the mother is Indian, even
if she feels she has no tribal affiliation, the exception does not apply).
93. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d. 298, 303 (Ind. 1988).
94. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Ky. 1996) (relying on Oklahoma’s lead, citing
the state’s high Indian population and role as a leader “in developing this doc-
trine”).  The case remains good law, even though Oklahoma has subsequently
rejected the doctrine.
95. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So.2d 331, 334–35 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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Minnesota99and Nebraska100 have avoided deciding whether or not to
adopt the existing Indian family exception.  South Carolina attempted
to reject the doctrine,101 but the case upon which it relied was over-
turned by the Supreme Court, leaving unresolved questions about
ICWA’s scope and the families and children it applies to.
D. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
As the existing Indian family exception began to percolate among
the states, the Supreme Court agreed to hear its first ICWA case, Mis-
sissippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield in 1989.102  While
Holyfield did not speak to the existing Indian family exception, it did
present the Supreme Court with its first chance to interpret key provi-
sions of the statute.  The case involved an unwed Choctaw mother who
traveled 200 miles to a hospital off the reservation to deliver twins.
She immediately placed the babies up for adoption.  Her purpose in
delivering off the reservation was to evade ICWA and its tribal juris-
diction provisions, believing a state court would make the adoption
process quicker and smoother.103  The twins’ father, also an enrolled
Choctaw, accompanied her and consented to the adoption.104
Two months later, the Tribe moved to vacate the adoption on the
grounds ICWA granted it exclusive jurisdiction.105  The case turned on
the word “domicile,” undefined by the statute, but determinative to
the jurisdiction provisions.106  Justice Brennan, writing for the major-
ity, reasoned Congress had not intended to leave the legally loaded
word up to state law.  If state law governed, nationwide uniformity
would be nonexistent.107
96. In re of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).  Application of the
doctrine may be weakening. See C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 S.W.2d 947, 951–52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992) (considering what would happen if ICWA applied, “being exceedingly
sensitive to the valuable purposes of the Act”).
97. Dawn M. v. Nev. State Div. of Child & Family Servs., 221 P.3d 1255, 1264 (Nev.
2009).
98. In re Morgan, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818, 43–44 (1997).
99. In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(argument ICWA did not apply because there was no existing Indian family was
not appealed and therefore not addressed).
100. Meaghan H. v. Mark J., 272 Neb. 846, 857, 725 N.W.2d 548, 557 (2007).
101. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 558 n.17 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2552 (2013).
102. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
103. Id. at 37.
104. Id. at 38.
105. Id.
106. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012); Holyfield 490 U.S. at 32.
107. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45–46.
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Justice Brennan was also adamant ICWA was enacted out of con-
cern not just for Indian children and families, but entire tribes.108
“Tribal jurisdiction . . . was not meant to be defeated by the actions of
individual members of the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely
about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the
impact on the tribes themselves . . . .”109  The dissent grudgingly con-
ceded this point.110  The Court held the twins had “inherited” their
mother’s reservation domicile.  ICWA applied and the tribal, not state,
court had jurisdiction to determine custody.111
III. ADOPTIVE COUPLE v. BABY GIRL
A. Facts
The Supreme Court addressed ICWA a second time in 2013’s Adop-
tive Couple v. Baby Girl.112  Like Holyfield, Adoptive Couple is an
adoption case.  Baby Girl’s birth father is an enrolled member of the
Cherokee Nation113 and her birth mother identifies as Hispanic.114
The couple dated on and off for over ten years and were engaged at the
time of Baby Girl’s conception.115  After learning of the pregnancy,
Birth Father pressured Birth Mother to move up the wedding date.116
Without a wedding, Birth Father refused to financially support Birth
Mother.117  Six months into the pregnancy, Birth Mother broke off the
engagement.118
Birth Mother was a single mother twice over and financially strug-
gling.  She eventually texted Birth Father to ask whether he wanted
108. Id. at 49.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Act gives Indian tribes certain rights, not
to restrict the rights of parents of Indian children, but to complement and help
effect them . . . .”).
111. Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
112. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
113. Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 18, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-
399). The trial court found that Birth Father’s heritage and culture were very
important to him, that he and his extended family reflected their culture at
home, and that Birth Father had strong cultural ties to the Cherokee Nation. Id.
114. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Adoptive Couple, 133 U.S. 2552 (No. 12-399).
115. Suzette Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part I, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY ME-
DIA NETWORK (May 6, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/
05/06/fight-baby-veronica-part-i-149219, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FA6B-
NUX9.
116. Brief of Birth Mother, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 5, Adoptive
Couple, 133 U.S. 2552 (No. 12-399).
117. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114; Brief of Birth Mother, supra note 116.
118. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 7; Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 114, at 21.
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to pay child support or relinquish his rights.119  He agreed to relin-
quish, assuming he would be relinquishing to her.120  But Birth
Mother had decided to place Baby Girl up for adoption.121  She se-
lected Adoptive Couple of South Carolina.122  In the final months of
pregnancy, Adoptive Couple frequently spoke with and financially
supported Birth Mother.123  They were present at Baby Girl’s birth in
September of 2009.124  The next day, Birth Mother relinquished her
parental rights and three days later, Adoptive Couple filed adoption
papers in South Carolina.125
Birth Mother was aware that Birth Father was an enrolled mem-
ber of the Cherokee Nation and this could affect the adoption.126
About a month prior to the birth, Birth Mother’s attorney contacted
the Nation about Birth Father’s enrollment status.127  The letter mis-
spelled Birth Father’s first name.128  It also provided the wrong birth
date and year for him.129  The Nation responded it could not identify
Birth Father as a member, with the caveat any incorrect information
could “invalidate this determination.”130
Although adoption papers were filed days after Baby Girl’s birth,
Birth Father was not notified until January of 2010.131  He signed the
Acceptance of Service notice presented to him, stating he would not
contest the adoption, and almost immediately realized he would not be
relinquishing to Birth Mother, but to strangers.132  The next day, he
119. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 7; Brief of Birth Mother, supra
note 116.
120. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113.
121. Brief of Birth Mother, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 10.
126. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 554 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013) (“[S]he testified she knew that if the Cherokee Nation were alerted to
Baby Girl . . . ‘some things were going to come into effect, but [she] wasn’t for [sic]
sure what.’” (alterations in original)).
127. Brief for Petitioners supra note 114, at 8.
128. Id. at 19–20.
129. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 9.
130. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.  Whether these “mistakes” were intentional
remains a contentious point.  Birth Mother states she notified her attorney the
letter was inaccurate. Id. Birth Father believes the misrepresentations were
purposeful because “[they] were essential to the progress of the adoption.”  Brief
for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 10.  The South Carolina Supreme
Court concluded, “[T]here were some efforts to conceal [Birth Father’s] Indian
status.” Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
131. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
132. Id.  Birth Father appeared genuinely shocked that Baby Girl was being adopted.
He attempted to grab the paper he had just signed, with the intent to destroy it.
Birth Father testified the process server told him, “I would be going to jail if I was
to do any harm to the paper.” Id.
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requested a stay of the adoption proceedings and three days later,
filed a summons and complaint to establish paternity and custody.133
Eight days after being notified his child was up for adoption, Birth
Father deployed to Iraq.134  Also in January of 2010, the Cherokee
Nation correctly identified Birth Father as a registered member and
determined Baby Girl was an Indian child for the purposes of
ICWA.135
B. Opinions Below
In November of 2011, the case came before the Charleston County
Family Court.  The judge found Adoptive Couple had failed to prove
Birth Father’s parental rights should be terminated, given the height-
ened standards employed by ICWA.136  The court granted custody of
Baby Girl to Birth Father.137  She returned to Oklahoma while Adop-
tive Couple started the appeal process.138
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.139
The majority agreed Birth Father qualified as a parent under
ICWA140 and was entitled to its protections.  Under ICWA, his volun-
tary consent to the termination of his parental rights had to be exe-
cuted in writing, and recorded before a judge, not just texted.141  In
addition, ICWA gave Birth Father the ability to withdraw his consent
at any time prior to the entry of a final adoption decree.142  Since
Birth Father never signed anything other than the Acceptance of Ser-
vice and his subsequent legal campaign was evidence of withdrawn
consent, the court found any termination of parental rights would
have to be involuntary.143  ICWA’s high standards made this task im-
possible.  No active efforts were taken to prevent the termination of
Birth Father and Baby Girl’s relationship,144 nor could Adoptive
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 556.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 564.
140. Under ICWA, a parent is “any biological parent of an Indian child” excluding un-
wed fathers whose paternity has not been acknowledged or established.  25
U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).  An “Indian child” is any unmarried individual under
eighteen who is either a member of an Indian tribe or eligible to be and the bio-
logical child of a member.  § 1903(4).
141. Id. § 1913(a).
142. § 1913(c).
143. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 561.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
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Couple prove Birth Father’s custody of Baby Girl would result in seri-
ous emotional or physical harm to her.145
C. Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, reversing in a
five-to-four decision.  In the Court’s opinion, the “mischief” ICWA was
designed to combat “was the unwarranted removal of Indian children
from Indian families.”146  ICWA’s provisions regarding involuntary
termination of parental rights mean “Indian parents who are already
part of an ‘Indian family’ are provided with access to ‘remedial ser-
vices . . . under § 1912(d) so that their ‘custody’ might be ‘continued’ in
a way that avoids . . . termination of parental rights under
§ 1912(f).”147  They mean nothing to a father who never had custody of
his child.
IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult, if not impossible, to be charged with the task of decid-
ing who a little girl should call “mommy” and “daddy” and remain
completely objective.  The Supreme Court opinion made clear the Jus-
tices were concerned about Baby Girl’s welfare.  As the majority told
her story, Baby Girl was “taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only
parents she had ever known”148 and given to her biological father who
had never made any “meaningful attempts to assume his responsibil-
ity of parenthood,”149 indeed, had “abandoned” her.150  Concern about
allowing other fathers to “play [their] ICWA trump card at the elev-
enth hour”151 to the detriment of their children, comfortably settled in
other families, compelled the Court to its conclusion. However, its
means of getting there trampled Congress’s deliberate and careful
construction of a statute that required the opposite result.
145. § 1912(f); Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 564.  The court believed Baby Girl
would be pained by her separation from Adoptive Couple, the only parents she
had ever known, but recognized the issue was whether she would be harmed by
being given to her Birth Father.  The court noted Birth Father had attempted to
intervene early and the bonding between Baby Girl and Adoptive Couple had
taken place mostly during the course of litigation, so that bond should not be held
against him. Id.
146. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561 (2013) (emphasis in the
original).
147. Id. at 2563.
148. Id. at 2556.
149. Id. at 2558.
150. Id. at 2557.  The dissent agreed that removing Baby Girl from Adoptive Couple’s
home would be upsetting to her. Id. at 2585 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I have
no wish to minimize the trauma of removing a 27-month-old child from her adop-
tive family.”).
151. Id. at 2565.
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A. Birth Father Is a Parent Under ICWA and Should Have
Been Afforded Its Protections
The Court began its analysis by remarking, “[w]e need not—and
therefore do not—decide whether Biological Father is a ‘parent.’”152
In a case revolving around termination of parental rights, this state-
ment is absurd.  ICWA defines a parent as “any biological parent . . . of
an Indian child . . . [excluding] the unwed father where paternity has
not been acknowledged or established.”153  Since Birth Father both ac-
knowledged his paternity and requested a test to establish it, neither
exclusion applied.154  Under the statute, an “Indian child” is an un-
married person under eighteen, eligible for tribal membership and
“the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”155  Baby Girl met
these conditions.  By virtue of being a biological parent of an Indian
child, Birth Father should have been privy to ICWA’s protections, such
as its requirements of active reunification efforts156 and heightened
burdens of proof.157
The Court argued this reading undermines a mother’s rights by
creating a “trump card” that allows a biological father to override a
birth mother’s decision to place their child up for adoption.158  It does
not.  First, Birth Mother could have invoked ICWA herself should she
have chosen to revoke her consent for the adoption because ICWA’s
protections flow from the child, not through the parents.159  In other
words, the fact that Baby Girl is an Indian child under ICWA means
both Birth Father and Birth Mother could have relied on ICWA, even
though Birth Mother is not herself Indian.  Second, mothers have a
relationship with their children that fathers do not and cannot, simply
by virtue of carrying and delivering a baby.160  In this sense, ICWA
attempts to level the playing field, ensuring the biological relationship
between mother and child does not preclude father from being in-
volved.  This is especially important in cases like this, where the evi-
152. Id. at 2560.
153. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
154. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555–56 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2552 (2013).
155. § 1903(4).
156. Id. § 1912(d).
157. § 1912(f).
158. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013).
159. See § 1903(9) (using the biological or legal connection to an Indian child as the
foundation for defining “parent”).
160. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding
when a potential mother and father disagree as to whether to terminate a preg-
nancy, the woman’s decision trumps because she is most “directly and immedi-
ately affected”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
894–95 (1992) (striking down a provision of a law requiring a wife to notify her
husband of her decision to seek an abortion because it imposes a “substantial
obstacle” on what a woman’s choice is).
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dence suggests Birth Mother concealed from, or at least misled, Birth
Father in what she was doing with their baby.161  Finally, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that fit and capable biological fathers
should have the option of raising their own children.162  Exercising
this option is key; the Court looks for a substantial relationship be-
tween parent and child.163  If an unwed biological father fails to culti-
vate a relationship with his child while the mother does, no one is
obligated to listen to his opinions about the child’s upbringing.164  But
where the mother and father are similarly situated in their parent-
child relationship, states cannot mute unwed fathers’ voices.165
Birth Mother and Birth Father were similarly situated since
neither played any role in the first four months of Baby Girl’s life.166
As a result, her voice should not have been the only one relevant in
Baby Girl’s adoption.167  This case is also easily distinguishable from
prior Supreme Court father’s-rights cases in terms of timing,168 the
presence of a federal statute, and the fact Birth Father faced an ex-
tended war-time deployment overseas days after learning of his
daughter’s pending adoption.169  Under these circumstances, if a bio-
logical mother decides at birth to sever all her ties to a child, a capable
biological father should have the first opportunity to step in.
If Congress meant to exclude unwed fathers no longer involved
with an Indian child’s mother at birth from ICWA, it would have.  The
testimonial history of ICWA gave Congress ample opportunity to con-
161. See supra note 130.
162. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (“[T]he biological connec-
tion . . . offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring.  If he grasps that opportunity and ac-
cepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future . . . .”); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”).
163. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
164. Id. at 262–267; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding an un-
wed father who had no contact with his eleven-year-old daughter and sought cus-
tody of her could not block her adoption by her mother and her mother’s husband
by refusing to consent to it).
165. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
166. Full disclosure of Birth Mother’s action would have likely changed Birth Father’s
role, however. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
167. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
168. The father in Lehr was not identified as the child’s father until one month after
the adoption petition was filed, by which time the child was already two.  Nor did
he bother to register on New York’s putative father registry, which would have
entitled him to notice of any adoption proceeding. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250–253.  In
Quilloin, the father waited eleven years to claim his son as his own in the hopes
of stopping his adoption, although he did not seek custody of his child or object to
his continued placement with his adoptive parents.  Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. It
should also be noted that both cases involved formal adoption of the children by
their biological mothers’ husbands.
169. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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template unwed, absent fathers and broken relationships.170  Con-
gress undoubtedly considered interracial relationships and how those
ought to be treated, too.171  Census data indicated interracial relation-
ships were on the rise.  In 1960, the Census found 29,000 American
Indian/white couples.172  By 1970, that number had grown to 85,000
and by 1980, two years after the passage of ICWA, interracial Ameri-
can Indian/white couples numbered 245,000.173
Congress even had warning ICWA could lead to undesirable conse-
quences because of the protections it afforded unwed and (potentially)
uninvolved parents.  The National Congress of American Indians cau-
tioned the bill diminished the ability of a biological parent to make
decisions regarding adoptive placements without court involve-
ment.174  In effect, every time an Indian child’s parent, whether In-
dian or not, decided to do something with that child, the court, the
tribe, and the other parent would all be parties to the action, with the
ability to derail it or at least substantially hinder it.  In words particu-
larly accurate considering Baby Girl’s case, the National Congress
wrote: “A parent’s wish should not be the sole controlling element in
the overturning of a placement. Because [a] placement is technically
invalid or legally defective, it does not follow that return to the par-
ent . . . is to the child’s advantage.  Again, the paramount standard
must be the child’s best interest . . . .”175
170. Several (perhaps even the majority of) women testifying before congressional
committees represented themselves as single mothers. See 1974 S. Hearing,
supra note 12, at 42, 51 (Sen. Abourezk questioning the involvement of a father);
id. at 224; 1977 S. Hearing, supra note 23, at 423 (statement of Charlotte Tsoi
Goodluck and Flo Eckstein) (observing many fathers tended to be casual, not
close, friends of the mother with little interest in assuming paternal
responsibility).
171. See 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 118 (statement of Mel Sampson) (discuss-
ing the adoption of a biracial child); id. at 125, 154; see also Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and
Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 87 (1978)
(statement of Sister Mary Clare, director of Catholic Social Services of Anchorage
Alaska) (“This bill gives priority to the preservation of a culture.  While we
strongly support such preservation, we urge that the interests of the natural par-
ents and the welfare of the child be given priority in any circumstances where
those goals clash.”).  In response, one Congressman proposed amending the bill to
allow unwed mothers to waive notice being tendered to the tribe. Id. at 89.  That
proposed amendment is not reflected in the enacted version of ICWA.  Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012).
172. U.S. Census Bureau, Race of Wife by Race of Husband, INTERRACIAL TABLES,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/interrace.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DZC9-SFKN.
173. Id.
174. 1977 S. Hearing, supra note 23, at 90 (written testimony of the National Con-
gress of American Indians).
175. Id. at 99.
536 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:517
The warning did not lead to Congress changing any rights of un-
wed parents.  Instead, Congress limited ICWA’s scope by exempting
only divorce custody proceedings176 and unwed fathers whose pater-
nity has not been established or acknowledged.177
Congress has declined to amend the statute to require some form of
contact beyond biology between a parent, a tribe, and an Indian child.
It has held this position even in the face of evidence ICWA’s presence
creates problems when ICWA children have little or no contact with
their Indian parent and his or her tribe.  Most frequently, these
problems are raised in adoption cases, where, as here, the proceedings
are nearly complete but interrupted by ICWA sanctioned interven-
tions.  Rep. Deborah Pryce proposed limiting ICWA178 by applying it
only if at least one biological parent was of Indian descent and main-
tained “significant social, cultural, or political affiliation with
the tribe.”179  The proposal received strong condemnation from the
Native community180 and was voted down.181  The law as left should
include Birth Father in its protections.  But this did not take the ma-
jority where it believed the case ought to have gone.  Ignoring the mes-
sage in Holyfield that ICWA should be applied uniformly,182 the Court
appeared to content itself with using state definitions of “parent”183
and moved on.
176. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
177. § 1903(9).
178. Her motivation came from a family in her district, engaged in a heated tribal
court battle, because it was discovered the twin girls they had raised for nearly
three years and were adopting had a great-great-great-grandparent identified as
a Pomo Indian and the tribe sought jurisdiction.  142 CONG. REC. H4166 (daily ed.
Apr. 30, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pryce).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 104-542, pt. 1, at 2 (1996).
180. Id.  The consensus was ICWA generally worked and the amendment would put
state courts back in their pre-ICWA position of managing Indian adoptions and
ignoring cultural relationships that extend beyond immediate families.  Twenty-
two tribes, the National Congress of American Indians (representing 201 tribes),
and multiple associations all wrote letters in opposition. Id. at n.1.
181. 104 CONG. REC. H4821 (daily ed. May 10, 1996).
182. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1989) (“[M]ost
fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives no reason to believe that Congress
intended to rely on state law for the definition of a critical term; quite the con-
trary.  It is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to mention its legislative
history and the hearings that led to its enactment, that Congress was concerned
about the rights of Indian families and Indian communities vis-a`-vis state
authorities.”).
183. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013) (“Biological Father
would have had no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”).
The Court also references Birth Father’s rights, or lack thereof, under Oklahoma
law. Id. at 2562.
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B. ICWA Does Not Support the Interpretation the Court
Gave It
Because the Court could not make a strong argument for ICWA’s
inapplicability by questioning Birth Father’s status as a parent, it
framed its entire argument around two words, “continued” and
“breakup.”  The Court reasoned § 1912(f) and its requirement of evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by the parent
is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child
was inapplicable because Birth Father never had custody of Baby
Girl.184  Likewise, § 1912(d), providing for active efforts to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family, was inapplicable because, the Court con-
cluded, Birth Father and Baby Girl never had a relationship; there
was nothing to “breakup.”185  Justice Sotomayor, writing in dissent,
criticized this method.  “[T]he majority begins its analysis by plucking
out of context a single phrase from the last clause of the last subsec-
tion of the relevant provision, and then builds its entire argument
upon it.  That is not how we ordinarily read statutes.”186  Even if the
Court did interpret statutes by focusing on a few words and phrases,
the words here still do not support the outcome.
1. Congress Did Not Intend to Require a Parent to Have Had
Prior Custody in Order to Invoke ICWA’s Protections
As the Court saw it, “[t]he adjective ‘continued’ plainly refers to a
preexisting state.”187  Justice Scalia rejected this definition, seeing
“no reason that ‘continued’ must refer to custody in the past rather
than custody in the future.”188  There is no basis in the statute for this
conclusion, either.  Congress has explicitly rejected any requirement
that a child have a preexisting connection with his or her Indian heri-
tage in order to be subject to the statute’s requirements.189  A draft
version of ICWA required, as a prerequisite to tribal-court jurisdiction,
that an Indian child have “significant” contacts with the tribe,190 but
that requirement does not appear in the enacted version.191  It makes
little sense for Congress to have explicitly rejected, numerous times, a
requirement for preexisting ties with an entity, yet indirectly intend
to require them for a relationship between individuals as closely re-
lated as father and daughter.
184. Id. at 2560.
185. Id. at 2562.
186. Id. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2560 (majority opinion).
188. Id. at 2571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-542, pt. 1 (1996) (proposing an amendment to ICWA re-
quiring significant connections between an Indian child and tribe, but voted
down); 104 CONG. REC. H4821 (daily ed. May 10, 1996).
190. Indian Child Welfare Act, S. 1214, 95th Cong. § 102(c) (1977).
191. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–34 (2012).
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Comparing the word “continued” with the word “returned” further
demonstrates what Congress had in mind.  In § 1913(c), Congress al-
lows a biological parent to withdraw voluntary relinquishment of pa-
rental rights at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of
adoption.192  If the parent does withdraw consent, the child is “re-
turned” to him or her.193  This provision is a response to testimony
Congress heard regarding biological mothers who delivered Indian ba-
bies and immediately relinquished custody to a set of adoptive par-
ents, then regretted that decision.194  These mothers could have had
no contact with their newborn; never touched or held them, much less
named or cared for them.  Yet, Congress believed sheer biology estab-
lished a strong enough preexisting bond between these women and
their children that there was something to return the infant to.  Cer-
tainly, the bond established in these cases is no greater than estab-
lished between Birth Father and Baby Girl,195 further undermining
the majority’s attempt to make the word “continued” a focal point.
Even if Birth Father never had physical custody of Baby Girl, prior
Supreme Court jurisprudence holds biological fathers have a connec-
tion with their children based on biology alone.196
2. The Court’s Construction of “Continued” Amounted to an
Amendment of the Statute, Expanding the Types of
Parents Excluded from ICWA
The Supreme Court opinion in Adoptive Couple effectively
amended the statute by adding to the list of parents not eligible for
ICWA protections.  Congress purposely did not extend ICWA’s protec-
tions to fathers who have not acknowledged or established their pater-
nity.197  Now, that list includes parents who never have custody of
their child.  The Court’s action is particularly concerning considering
the impact it will have on parents, predominately fathers, who are
never given the opportunity to have a custodial relationship with their
child.  The majority “conclude[d] that ICWA’s substantive protections
are available only to a subset of ‘parent[s]’: those who have previously
had physical or state-recognized legal custody of his or her child.”198
192. Id. § 1913(c).
193. Id.
194. Several witnesses recounted stories of young girls being hounded by welfare
workers to place their infants up for adoption while still in the hospital. See 1974
S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 154 (statement of Mary Ann Lawrence); id. at 68
(statement of Cheryl Spider DeCoteau).
195. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Baby Girl had been in Birth
Father’s physical custody for over a year.  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731
S.E.2d 550, 556 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
196. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).
198. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2575 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting) (second alteration in original).
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What of biological fathers who are unaware of their child’s existence
because it is concealed from them, or fathers who are in prison, or like
Birth Father, absent overseas, serving their country?  What of noncus-
todial fathers who pay child support and routinely visit?  Suppose the
custodial parent places the child, for whatever reason, up for adoption,
or the child is involuntarily removed from the custodial home.  Under
the majority’s construction of the statute, these parents would not be
privy to ICWA’s heightened protections because, although they partici-
pate in their child’s upbringing, they never have custody.  The major-
ity admitted as much, but dismissed such concerns as likely limited to
a “relatively small” number of cases.199  The Court ignored the many
relationships worth preserving that do not take custodial form—sib-
ling, grandparent, friendship, communal ties, to name a few.  Instead,
the Court interpreted the law to reflect what five people think a family
should act like.  Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, believed this was
wrong:
In an ideal world, perhaps all parents would be perfect.  They would live up to
their parental responsibilities by providing the fullest possible financial and
emotional support to their children. . . .  In an ideal world parents would never
become estranged and leave their children caught in the middle.  But we do
not live in such a world.  Even happy families do not always fit the custodial-
parent mold for which the majority would reserve ICWA’s substantive protec-
tions; unhappy families all too often do not.  They are families nonetheless.
Congress understood as much.200
The requirement of previous custody in order to qualify for ICWA
protections is circular, especially in this case.  Birth Father fought to
have custody of his daughter from the day he learned she was no
longer living with Birth Mother.201  Because he was never given the
opportunity to have custody, he has no custody that can be continued
and is therefore denied custody forever.
3. ICWA’s Idea of “Breakup” Connotes Far More than the Court
Allowed It To
In light of the statute’s history and stated purpose, the Court’s con-
struction of the word “breakup” is even more troubling.  Relying on the
American Heritage Dictionary, the Court defined breakup as a “dis-
continuance of a relationship,”202 and concluded when an Indian child
has never been in the parent’s custody, there is no relationship to be
199. Id. at 2563, n.8 (majority opinion).  Why the interests of a small group should or
can be sacrificed for convenience is not addressed and is particularly ironic given
ICWA’s purpose of protecting the interests of a minority from the actions of the
majority.
200. Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
201. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2552 (2013).
202. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
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discontinued.203  “Says who? Certainly not the statute,” the dissent
countered.204  ICWA’s vision of termination of parental rights is broad,
meaning any action resulting in the termination of the parent–child
relationship.205  Likewise, interpretations from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs advance a broad construction of the word breakup.206  A par-
ent–child relationship goes beyond physical or legal custody.  In the
words of an earlier Court, “[t]he tangible fibers that connect parent
and child have infinite variety.”207
The entire history of ICWA makes apparent this is even more so in
Indian culture.  Congress specifically found ICWA was necessitated by
the fact administrative and judicial bodies “failed to recognize the es-
sential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”208  As the
congressional committees heard time and time again, applying a
white standard of what constitutes a parent–child relationship ignores
tribal culture and custom and fails Indian parents and their chil-
dren.209  From an Indian cultural perspective, the question of whether
a relationship exists between parent and child at birth is answered
with a simple yes.  The perplexing question is how such a relationship
can be severed.  “The spiritual bonds between . . . child and family, as
acknowledged in native peoples’ cultural beliefs, make severance in-
comprehensible.”210  Even in traditional Indian adoptions, ties be-
tween a child and his or her biological parents were not terminated211
and biological parents frequently continued to be involved in the
child’s life.212
Considering ICWA was enacted because of the application of white,
middle class cultural standards, it is ironic the majority turned to the
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2576 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
205. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii) (2012).  Note that the idea of a parent–child relationship is
not defined in the statute by the presence or absence of custody. Id.
206. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,592 (Nov. 26, 1979) (not codified) (stating breakup is not synonymous with
divorce alone).
207. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012).
209. See generally 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12; 1977 S. Hearing, supra note 23.
210. Brooks, supra note 59, at 665 (footnotes omitted).
211. Barbara A. Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family,
79 NEB. L. REV. 577, 615 (2000) (describing “a more fluid concept of child rearing
in which biology and formal adoption are not the only routes to the obligations
and responsibilities of parenthood”).
212. Id. at 616; see also Brooks, supra note 59, at 665 nn.31–32 (noting the words
“orphan,” illegitimate” and “adoption” are unrecognized in any of the 252 living
Native languages and that adoption, tribally speaking, is the child choosing a
substitute parent) (citing Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Place-
ments of Indian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 52–56 (1979)).
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American Heritage Dictionary to define breakup.  But even in plain,
Anglo-American English, to conclude a breakup is simply a discontin-
uance of a relationship is to stop short of the word’s full meaning and
connotation.  A breakup goes beyond the relationship.  It severs one
from family and friends, from places, belongings, traditions, and sto-
ries.213  ICWA is a congressional attempt to prevent exactly this, rec-
ognizing tribal continuance depends on children.214
There are some things a breakup does not sever.  Baby Girl and
Birth Father will always have a relationship that runs skin deep.  Of
course, this is true of any birth parent and child relationship.  But in a
society that has moved closer to, but has yet to achieve, judgment
solely on character content and not color, that concern is particularly
acute here.  Part of ICWA’s purpose was to protect Indian children
themselves from the crippling effects of being raised in a majority cul-
tural setting and then denied that identity upon reaching adoles-
cence.215 A psychiatrist testified that adult Indian adoptees
remembered when they were children “seeing cowboys and Indians on
TV and feeling that Indians were a historical figure.”216  But when
these same children reached adolescence, their skin color became their
identification.  Parents of white children discouraged interracial dat-
ing; job opportunities and bank loans were mysteriously less available
than they were for white peers.217  “[S]ociety was putting on them an
identity which they didn’t possess and . . . which they really [didn’t]
know how to behave in.”218  This identity confliction manifested itself
in long-term emotional problems in adulthood.219  Adult Indian
adoptees have been found to have higher rates of chemical depen-
dence, social disability and psychological problems, including schizo-
phrenia, and post traumatic stress disorder.220
213. For a discussion of the effects of family breakups on children, see, for example,
Nekima Levy-Pounds, Children of Incarcerated Mothers and the Struggle for Sta-
bility, 2 AM. U. MODERN AM. 14 (2006); Phillip R. Shaver et al., What’s Love Got to
Do with It? Insecurity and Anger in Attachment Relationships, 16 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 491 (2009).
214. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2012); Metteer, supra note 10, at 651–52.
215. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 46–49 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer,
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota); id. at 6 (statement of William
Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian Affairs) (“In our efforts
to make Indian children white, I think it’s clear that we’re destroying them.”).
216. 1974 S. Hearing, supra note 12, at 46 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer,
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 46–49
219. Felicia Bertin Rocha, Iowa ICWA: Practical Considerations for Practitioners, So-
cial Workers and Service Providers, THE IOWA LAW., July 2005, at 5–6 archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/A9ZH-HHP9.  Collectively, these problems are referred to
as Split Feather Syndrome.
220. See ICWA from the Inside Out: ‘Split Feather Syndrome,’ MINN. DEPT. OF HUMAN
SERVS. (July 2005), http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/children/documents/
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Concerns about the impact of interracial adoptions are not limited
to Indian-child, white-parent relationships.  But ICWA is a specific in-
stance of Congress recognizing and regulating the effects of cross-cul-
tural adoptions.  The majority argued allowing Indian parents greater
protection to foster relationships with their biological children, solely
on the basis of race, raised equal protection concerns.221  The Court
however has a long history of recognizing federal legislation specifi-
cally singling out Indians and tribes as “expressly provided for in the
Constitution.”222  Such classification is not racial, but rather recog-
nizes tribes as separate quasi-sovereigns.223
Prior Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear the Court here
was not casting its net wide enough in identifying the parties of the
supposed breakup.  By making the Indian family consist of just Baby
Girl and Birth Father, the Court ignored its own precedent.  In
Holyfield, the Court found Congress in enacting ICWA was concerned
not only with the interests of Indian children and families, but the
tribes themselves.224  Fundamentally, it is impossible to envision a
law that both forbids two consenting parents from breaking up any
relationship between the tribe, themselves and their babies
(Holyfield), and denies a willing biological father, backed by the tribe,
the right to continue a relationship with his child (Adoptive Couple).
ICWA is that law.
4. What Place for the Existing Indian Family Exception?
The Court’s interpretation of ICWA is further weakened by the fact
it never mentioned the existing Indian family doctrine.225  Factually,
this case is representative of the types of cases state courts that recog-
nize the exception have applied the doctrine to.226  Both parties
brought up the existing Indian family exception in their briefs.227
While state court decisions and interpretations of federal law are by
no means binding on the Supreme Court, the Court ignored an already
existing doctrine that reached the place it wanted to get to.  State
pub/dhs16_180049.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4XBA-CB9E; Peter
Menzies, Clinic Head, Aboriginal Services Centre for Addiction and Mental
Health, Address at University of Toronto: Overview Aboriginal Mental Health
(June 17, 2009).
221. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
222. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977).
223. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1974) (upholding federal hir-
ing standards preferring Native Americans in the filling of Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs vacancies).
224. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989).
225. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552.
226. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982); In re Adoption
of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
227. Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 113, at 27; Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 114 at 51–53.
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courts have debated the doctrine for over thirty years.228  They have
decided hundreds of cases on similar facts, while this is a case of first
impression for the Supreme Court.229  Over three decades, these state
courts have fashioned opinions that thoroughly address the justifica-
tions for accepting or rejecting the doctrine.  Stating ICWA only ap-
plies to existing Indian families and justifying this statement the
same way the state courts have would have been much simpler than
the complex, and ultimately unsuccessful, dance revolving around
“continued” and “breakup.”
C. Applying ICWA to Noncustodial Parents Does Not Raise
Public Policy Concerns
Lastly, the Court argued the interpretation of ICWA given by
South Carolina’s Supreme Court would raise grave public policy con-
cerns by essentially rendering Indian children unadoptable.230  The
Court feared that if an Indian child adoption could be derailed “at the
eleventh hour” by a parent playing an “ICWA trump card,” prospective
adoptive parents would think twice before considering an Indian
child.231  In light of ICWA’s history, Congress undoubtedly did intend
to make Indian child adoptions more difficult.232  If adoption was nec-
essary, then Congress specified it preferred children remain in the In-
dian community.233  While the Court may have felt these were bad
public policies, and indeed they may be, Congress, not the Court, is
charged with creating them.234  Besides, characteristics other than
race tend to be bigger “deal breakers” for potential adoptive parents.
Age and disability are the biggest obstacles to a child seeking adop-
tion.  Only thirty percent of potential adoptive mothers would consider
adopting a child with a severe disability or older than thirteen.235  In
contrast, nearly ninety-five percent of potential adoptive mothers
would be willing to adopt a child of another race, not white or black.236
228. Kansas was the first jurisdiction to recognize the existing Indian family excep-
tion, in 1982. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168.
229. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 77–101 and accompanying text.
230. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
231. Id.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 41.
233. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under
State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the con-
trary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other
members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”).
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
235. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND
MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 33 tbl.15 (2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
9RA9-957Y.
236. Id.
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The Court should have been more concerned with the policy its
holding impliedly endorses.  By making ICWA applicable only if there
is some form of custodial relationship, the Court encourages miscom-
munication and perhaps even fraud in ICWA adoption cases.  Defeat-
ing a birth father’s attempts to disrupt an adoption with ICWA, the
Court whispers, can be done.  Just hold out as long as possible before
notifying him because the courts will not and, in fact, now cannot, rec-
ognize he has any relationship, save custodial, with his child, regard-
less of why that is.
After Adoptive Couple, should rates of Indian child adoptions fall,
the most likely cause will be potential adoptive parents hesitant to
wade into the mess the Court has created of ICWA. Adoptive Couple
focused on one part of ICWA, making clear § 1912(d) and (f) no longer
apply if the parent never had custody of the child.237  The Court did
not clarify how its holding impacts other sections.  For instance, how
does this case interact with § 1921, which provides that “[i]n any case
where State . . . law . . . provides a higher standard of protection to the
rights of the parent[,] . . . apply [that] standard”?238  Does this mean
Adoptive Couple is irrelevant in states where fathers of children born
out of wedlock have more rights than they do in Oklahoma or South
Carolina?239  If the protections afforded a parent under ICWA depend
on state law, Holyfield’s vision of ICWA being applied uniformly disap-
pears.240  Parents of Indian children and, by extension, tribes, are
once again placed in the position Congress sought to remove them
from, where protection depends on luck of location.
Even if codified state law does not extend protections to noncus-
todial parents, judicial law still might, at least in ICWA cases.  By fail-
ing, again, to address the existing Indian family exception, the Court
left open the possibility states could circumvent the Court’s holding by
rejecting the doctrine, thereby providing a higher standard of protec-
tion to Indian parents.241  Even if Adoptive Couple foreclosed the pos-
sibility of rejecting the exception (unlikely, since the opinion makes no
mention of it242), what of states that have already rejected it?  Are
those precedents overturned, the statutes struck down as conflicting
237. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
238. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (2012).
239. For instance, in Nebraska, a biological mother placing a child for adoption has a
statutory obligation to inform any possible biological fathers of their right to re-
linquish and consent to the adoption, or to fight it. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.12
(Reissue 2008).  The dissent notes several other states have similar require-
ments. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2581 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
240. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1989).
241. Rejecting the doctrine means parents do not have to have any prior contact with
their children or their tribe to invoke ICWA. See, e.g., In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543,
549–51 (Kan. 2009); Leatherman v. Yancey, 103 P.3d 1099, 1108 (Okla. 2004).
242. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552.
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with federal law?  Many questions linger, but the huge financial and
emotional costs of litigating the answers are incentives for both adop-
tive parents and tribes to not ask them.
Baby Girl herself is evidence of the mess the Court has left.  The
highest Court had supposedly decided her case, but the path forward
proved anything but clear or easy.  On remand, the South Carolina
Supreme Court stated since ICWA did not apply, state law, which did
not require Birth Father’s consent to Baby Girl’s adoption, did.243
There was no need to terminate Birth Father’s;ndash;rights because
he had none, and the family court was given the green light to finalize
the adoption.244  The Oklahoma Supreme Court waded in, issuing a
stay to delay a county court order requiring Birth Father to return
Baby Girl to Adoptive Couple.245  South Carolina Governor Nikki
Haley responded by signing a warrant for Birth Father’s extradition
to South Carolina to face custodial interference charges and up to five
years in prison.246  The United Nations weighed in, commenting on
the importance of respecting the rights of indigenous people.247
Oklahoma eventually lifted the stay, allowing Adoptive Couple to
regain physical custody of Baby Girl.248  Two weeks later, Birth Fa-
ther, stating he loved Baby Girl “too much to continue to have her in
the spotlight,” announced he would drop all pending litigation.249  The
tribe agreed to do the same, effectively making Adoptive Couple Baby
Girl’s forever family.250
243. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 53 (2013), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(2013).
244. Id. at 54.
245. Han Si Lo Wang, ‘Baby Veronica’ Custody Battle Continues, Blog post in Code
Switch, NPR (Sept. 11, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/
2013/09/11/221402527/baby-veronica-custody-battle-continues, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/59Y-NBMX.  The stay was lifted September 24th without explana-
tion. Sheriff: No Timeline on Arrival of Capobiancos, Veronica in Lowcountry,
ABC NEWS 4 (Charleston) (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.abcnews4.com/
story/23506646/oklahoma-supreme-court-lifts-stay, archived at http://perma.unl.
edu/ZR38-LND6.
246. Michael Overall, Q&A on ‘Baby Veronica’ Legal Battles, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 26,
2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/q-a-on-baby-veronica-legal
-battles/article_9df60fd2-2bee-55c0-b5a8-72dd72ac7f1c.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/BRC5-QDHC.
247. Ariane de Vogue, ‘Baby Veronica’ Custody Case Rages On, blog post in The Note,
ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/
09/baby-veronica-custody-case-rages-on/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SM5
H-58PH.
248. Sheriff: No Timeline on Arrival of Capobiancos, supra note 245.
249. Michael Overall, Baby Veronica Case: Dusten Brown to Stop Custody Fight for
Veronica, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/baby-ve-
ronica-case-dusten-brown-to-stop-custody-fight-for/article_2d903520-319a-11e3-
abf1-0019bb30f31a.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/A6PV-3SDQ.
250. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
As they say, hard cases make bad law. Adoptive Couple is indica-
tive of this.  In an effort to reach what the majority deemed the best
outcome, the Justices missed the mark when it came to applying
ICWA as Congress intended.  The convoluted interpretations the
Court gave to words plucked out of the statue severely limit its appli-
cation and threaten to return Indian tribes to their pre-ICWA position
of having their children siphoned away.  Congress could respond by
explicitly listing whom ICWA’s protections flow to, or define the word
“breakup” and address what it means by continued custody.  Given
the current state of Washington affairs, this seems unlikely.251  As the
aftermath of the Supreme Court decision demonstrates, cases involv-
ing ICWA are now likely to remain in limbo, as different courts wrestle
with what to do next.  Caught in the middle of the storm will be Baby
Girls and Boys.
It is also said it takes a village to raise a child.  Adoptive Couple
have promised to keep Baby Girl in contact with her Birth Father and
his extended family.252  Cherokee Nation has vowed to hold them to
that promise.253  How much of this is rhetoric in the face of a high-
profile case remains to be seen.254  But in the face of language from
the Supreme Court discussing breakups, and endings, and narrow
ideas of what constitutes a family, the promise of surrounding chil-
dren with many individuals who love, educate, and care for them
should be encouraged and fostered.  That is a dream all races and gen-
erations should consider worth working towards.
251. The 112th Congress (2011–2012) managed to do more with less, passing the
smallest amount of legislation while recording the fifth highest recorded votes
total since such statistics have been collected.  Chris Cillizza, The Least Produc-
tive Congress Ever, blog post in The Fix, WASH. POST, July 17, 2013, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-congress-
ever/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5UAE-FS7A.  The 113th Congress, sitting
when this case was decided, looks on track to beat that record, enacting 104 bills
two-thirds of the way through its session, the lowest number since data began
being tracked.  Josh Tauberer, More on Congressional Productivity, 2/3rds into
the 113th Congress, GOVTRACK (May 24, 2014), https://www.govtrack.us/blog/
2014/05/24/more-on-congressional-productivity-23rds-into-the-113th-congress/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LH9X-VDEY.
252. Sheriff: No Timeline on Arrival of Capobiancos, supra note 245.
253. Id.
254. Although it could have been the emotion of the moment, at the press conference
announcing he would no longer place his child’s life at the center of litigation,
Birth Father did not appear too optimistic.  Part of his statement was addressed
to his daughter in the future.  He told her: “One day you will read about this time
in your life.  Never, ever for one second . . . doubt how much I love you, how hard I
fought for you or how much you mean to me.” See generally, supra note 249.
